Abstract. This article is about the religious roots of violence, in particular reli gious terrorism. The author argues that there is a great reluctance to study this relationship. This is unfortunate because only on the basis of a realistic estimate of the facts can a successful counterterrorist strategy be developed. One of the problems with religious violence is that holy scriptures, in some passages, exhort believers to violent acts. In combination with a theory of ethics that is known as "divine command morality" this is problematic. Even if the holy book contains only a small percentage of passages invoking violence they pose a problem if the whole book is considered to be holy and the word of God.
true, as Lewis contends, that "'Know thy enemy' must be the guiding light for any nation-state in developing operational counterterrorism policy." So if we want to take Lewis seriously this would bring us to the aim o f un derstanding the relationship between religion and violence. W hat exactly is that relation?
in this article the relationship between religion and violence will be studied, against the backdrop o f the most important manifestation o f reli gious violence: Islamist terrorism. But although Islamist terrorism is the most well known manifestation o f religious violence, it can only be under stood if we also inquire into the nature o f the theist worldview in general. The roots o f violence within Islam can only be adequately researched and understood against the background o f the roots o f violence in the other two theist religions: Christianity and the Jewish religion. So we should high light not only the Koran and other Islamic sources as relevant material for our study, but the Bible (in particular the Old Testament) as well.
Although a considerable number o f commentators are now engaged in studying the relationship between religion and violence, this area o f interest still remains highly controversial. There is, apparently, a great reluctance among scholars and the public at large to acknowledge that there could be such a connection. Many people, and certainly not all o f them religious be lievers, simply cannot accept that religion also has a dark and violent side. Studying the relationship between religion and violence is even considered to be rude or offensive to religious sensibilities. The strategies to explain away the manifest connections are so prevalent that they form an interest ing object o f study in themselves. This is also a topic o f this article.
In the first section I will start with some preliminary remarks about religion and violence. Section II tries to understand why the religious roots o f violence are so often overlooked, by comparing "religion" to what is dearest to us: a family member or a loved one. In section III, I will try to answer the question how we can successfully do research into the religious roots o f violence. Section IV entails an analysis o f the meta-ethical theory that is the basis o f religious violence in the three theistic traditions: divine command morality. Section V presents us with the results o f this theory in the figure o f the biblical forerunner o f religious terrorism (Phinehas). Sec tions VI and VII deal with objections that may be presented to the analysis elaborated in this article, while section VIII is dedicated to a comparison between Christianity and Islam as sources o f religious violence. As will be made clear in this article my claim is that an analysis such as the one pre sented here should not be considered "anti-religious", nor "anti-Christian", "anti-Jewish" or "anti-Islamic", but necessary in order to make a valid con tribution to the analysis o f the contemporary roots o f violence. I am not pessimistic about the possibilities o f the theistic religions refraining from violence, but in order to be successful in this regard we have to know what we have to look for. In other words: only a sober, objective and balanced view o f the roots o f violence in the three theistic religions can be helpful in this age o f religious turmoil and rising fundamentalism and fanaticism.
I. b a s s a m t i b i o n r e l i g i o n a n d v i o l e n c e in earlier times violence and intimidation were regarded as necessary for the preservation o f religion. A religious war, or the torture o f a heretic or an infidel, were not considered to be morally outrageous, but necessary for the preservation o f belief and ultimately the social order. This attitude is not very common nowadays, at least not in the Western world. Neverthe less, that does not mean that people take religion to task when it seems to be connected with violence. W hat the advocates o f religion usually do, is simply deny that religion has anything to do with violence as perpetrated by e.g. terrorists (religious terrorism being the clearest manifestation o f religious violence nowadays). They say: "Religion is only superficially involved in this type o f violence. Terrorism is caused by exclusion, rac ism, personality disorders, social and economic inequality and lots o f other things, but one thing is certain: this violence has nothing to do with reli gion." That means that the terms "religious violence" or "religious terror ism" are misnomers.
W hen freethinkers, atheists, secularists or simply less prejudiced com mentators on religion point out what, according to their analysis, the re lationship between religion and violence amounts to, the advocates o f re ligion, in most cases, react with dismay and even indignation. How can anybody be so stupid as to not see that religion is only "superficially" con nected with the behaviour we all reject? How can we fail to understand that bad men and women "misuse" religion for their own petty causes? If the critic o f religion persists in his indictments, the advocates o f religion usually get more impatient. They accuse him o f "insulting" believers, and they even try to silence him with blasphemy laws. Terms like "religious terrorism" or "religious violence" are invented by the enemies o f religion, they say, namely, by the secularists, the atheists, people who want to scoff at religion -but religion itself, many people argue, is in its very nature pure and pristine. But, as the Islam-scholar, political scientist and professor o f international relations Bassam Tibi (1944-) rightly stresses when referring to the sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer (2003 and , "Jihadism as 'ter ror in the mind o f G od' is based on 'ideals and ideas' which are 'authenti cally and thoroughly' religious" (Tibi, 2008, p. 98) . Time and again Tibi warns us about the popular mistake of underestimating the relationship between contemporary terrorism and its roots in Islamic doctrine, because the Islamist challenge can only be met if we first acknowledge that parts o f the Islamic tradition are vitiated by Islamist ideology. Tibi contends this as a Muslim and because it is necessary to separate violent tendencies from peaceful tendencies within the Islamic tradition (Tibi, 2009 ).
This approach is as unpopular nowadays as was once the case for the study o f the Inquisition in relation to Catholic doctrine. The aim o f this article is to present some prolegomena to a less biased attitude towards religion. And by "less biased" I mean an attitude that tries to understand where the violent element in religion comes from.
Let us first shoot a glance at some classic discussions about this theme in the past.
i i . c a n a f a t h e r c o n c e d e t h a t h i s d a u g h t e r c o m m i t t e d h o m i c i d e ?
One o f the most important historical documents on the subject o f religion in relation to morals is a dialogue by Plato: the Euthyphro (Taylor, 1977) .
This starts with a dramatic scene. Euthyphro has just deposed murder charges against his own father for the death o f a servant. Prosecuting your own father on such a charge is quite uncommon and Socrates seems very surprised: "Good heavens! (. . .) Euthyphro, most men would not know how they could do this and be right" (Plato, Euthyphro, 4a) . Socrates further inquires: "Is then the man your father killed one o f your relatives? Or is that obvious, for you would not prosecute your father for the murder o f a stranger." Now Euthyphro is shocked:
It is ridiculous, Socrates, for you to think that it makes any difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only watch whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted justly, let him go, but if not, one should prosecute, if, that is to stay, the killer shares your hearth and table (Plato, Euthyphro, 4c) .
From a perspective o f abstract justice Euthyphro may be right. But at the same time it seems realistic to suppose that not all o f us would act in accordance with his high morals.
Suppose there is a father who has a lovely daughter o f eighteen years. Not a very difficult state o f affairs to imagine, o f course, because many daughters are lovely in the eyes o f their fathers.
On a gloomy day the police arrive at the front door o f this father. W hat has happened? The police inform him: "Your daughter has committed a very serious crime: homicide." W hat would be his reaction? Every father's first reaction will be one o f indignation and disbelief. This cannot be true. The people accusing his daughter -bystanders, the police, the whole world -must have made a terrible mistake. Why? Be cause his daughter is no murderess, o f course. Every loving father knows that for sure. So his state o f disbelief automatically transforms itself into a state o f denial. Now let us take the step to religion. W hat do religions have in com mon with daughters? Every believer knows for sure that God is love, and religion is the most holy thing in the world. That is also the reason why the believer is a believer in the first place. Now there are strange people who suddenly come up with stories about the violent aspects o f religion: scientists, scholars, freethinkers, secularists, atheists, critics o f religion. Their accounts cannot be true. They must be prejudiced by their negative attitude towards the holy creed. "If my religion had a violent tendency then I m yself would be a potential criminal", the believer will tell us. This is too absurd even to contemplate.
And so the loving father (or loving husband) and the true believer will never accept that their favourites are in any way implicated in gross vio lence or other atrocious acts. As philosopher Brand Blanshard wrote:
Next to romantic love, religion is the area of human life where reason is most easily swept away. Against faith, reason has little chance with the great major ity (Blanshard, 1984, p. 105 ).
Yet there are also differences between fathers and true believers. in the state o f denial that both share, the father is in a less fortunate position than the true believer. That has to do with the nature o f reality. Daughters are humans, that is: physical entities. So homicide, as punishable by law, is also something that can be empirically verified. And that means the loving father, although reluctantly, has to face the facts if the evidence is as strong as the police contend, especially if corroborated by the judge.
The situation o f the true believer in his state o f denial is more promis ing. That has to do with the nature o f religion. Religion is not -as daugh ters are -something that can be empirically perceived. Religion is some thing mental, not a spatiotemporal thing. Religion is something mental, because ideas are mental. So whether the motives o f religious terrorists are truly "religious" is a matter o f interpretation. And for the true believer, so it seems, there are always routes of escape. He can always (and will often) say: "it was not religion, it was culture, social position, mental condition and many other things", but not religion that was the cause o f the trouble.
This attitude was aptly formulated by the philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820 Spencer ( -1903 , him self an agnostic, when he said:
The truly religious element of Religion has always been good; that which has proved untenable in doctrine and vicious in practice, has been its irreligious ele ment; and from this it has been undergoing purification (Spencer, 1995, p. 3).
So religion is good, according to Spencer. W hat seems bad in religion is simply "irreligious" .
O f course, numbers count. You cannot say a religion is violent because only a few believers make a totally unwarranted connection between their criminal behaviour and their religion. But if during the 16th and 17th cen tury witches, heretics and infidels were burnt at the stake and religious and political leaders adduced theological reasons provided by scripture, you cannot say: "this has nothing to do with religion" . In those days Christian ity was a violent religion. Because nowadays witches, heretics and infidels are not burned anymore, we should say that contemporary Christianity is much less violent than its predecessor in the 16th and 17th century. But what we should not do -as the apologists o f religion want us to do -is say that because nowadays Christianity has lost many o f its violent characteristics the violence perpetrated in earlier times had nothing to do with religion.
To substantiate my claim, let us turn back to the quote from Spencer. Suppose we substitute the word "capitalistic" for "religious" and "capi talism " for "religion". W hat would be the consequence? In that case we would get a sentence like the following:
The truly capitalistic element of Capitalism has always been good; that which has proved untenable in doctrine and vicious in practice, has been its 'uncapi talistic' element; and from this it has been undergoing purification.
Someone saying this would be laughed out o f court. Political ideo logies, like life-and worldviews, have a social aspect that may and must be evaluated, everybody would tell us. W hy should we make an exception for religion?
There may be a good reason for this. That reason could be that a reli gious worldview differs structurally from all other worldviews. And that difference (we have to emphasise this) has to be relevant to underpin the norm that religious worldviews should be exempt from criticism whereas non-religious worldviews can be evaluated in the light o f the behaviour o f their adherents and the character o f their basic doctrines. Such argumenta tion may be possible. We should never exclude the possibility that someone presents us with a spectacular analysis (it surely would be) making exactly this point. As long as this is not the case, however, we have reasons to be sceptical and there is reason to critique the attitude that Spencer advocates and is being taken for granted by so many people. i i i . h o w t o d i s c o v e r a r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n r e l i g i o n a n d v i o l e n c e How can this dispute about the relationship between religion and violence be solved? Can it be solved at all? Or will this always remain a matter o f opinion, reflecting the personal life stances o f the disputants? There are at least two ways, so it seems, to discover if there is such a relationship and, if so, what its nature is.
The first "research-strategy," for inquiring into this matter could be: to look whether a certain religion is in possession o f a revealed holy book on which the adherents o f that religion base their beliefs and moral behaviour. This is indeed the case with the Jewish, Christian and Muslim religions. Haught (1995 Haught ( , 1990 and many other commentators.
It suffices to illustrate this point with some remarks on only two pas sages from holy books; one from the Koran, the other from the Bible. I will start with the youngest revelation; the Koran.
In the Koran (24:2) there is a passage on adultery and fornication. The passage runs as follows;
The woman and the man guilty of adultery or fornication, flog each of them with 100 stripes; Let no compassion move you in their case, in a matter pre scribed by Allah, if you believe in Allah and the Last Day.
This passage was the subject o f a discussion, in the Eastern and Western world, concerning a 20-year-old woman from Qatif, Saudi Arabia, reported to have been abducted by several men and repeatedly raped. Judges found that the victim was, herself, guilty. Her crime is called "mingling". When she was abducted the woman was sitting in a car with a man not related to her by blood or by marriage. This is illegal in Saudi Arabia. She was sen tenced to 200 lashes with a bamboo cane (Hirsi Ali, 2007) . This sentence will be described by many people as draconian, outra geous or unjust. W hy is the woman sentenced in this harsh way? Because the Saudi law prescribes this sentence for this specific offence. But why is the Saudi law so cruel in this matter? The reason is obvious; because this penalty is prescribed in the Koran.
The Koran is not the only Holy Book that provides compelling reasons for a very harsh -by contemporary standards -treatment o f offenders o f the law. A good place to start our argument on the scriptural foundations o f violence in the Bible is with Deuteronomy 13; 1-3 ("a warning against idolatry", as the English Standard Version euphemistically puts it). There we find the following passage;
If a prophet or a dreamer of dreams arises among you and gives you a sign or a wonder, and the sign or wonder that he tells you comes to pass, and if he says, "let us go after other gods", which you have not known, "and let us serve them", you shall not listen to the words of that prophet or that dreamer of dreams.
The attitude exemplified in this passage cannot come as a shock to a well-informed reader. Every faith will discourage its devotees from going after other gods. Every religion tries to keep its community together and so does the Jewish religion. The Bible says; "You shall walk after the Lord your God and fear him and keep his commandments and obey his voice, and you shall serve him and hold fast to him " (Deut. 13; 4-5).
iv . d i v i n e c o m m a n d m o r a l i t y a n d t h e i s m
The theory o f ethics that is implicit in this passage is what has been called the "divine command theory" o f ethics (Idziak, 1979) . It holds that the believer is supposed to follow the ethical injunctions that are revealed by God, manifested in Scripture. There is a problem though. Doing this can imply tensions with what we consider morally appropriate or what is le gally required or forbidden by civil law or "human law" (as contrasted with "divine law"). This is e.g. the problem that Abraham faces when ordered by God to sacrifice his son (Genesis 22).
So far, Deuteronomy has suggested nothing that can be considered problematic in the sense o f violating the moral or civil law, but in Deuter onomy 13:5 there is a turn. After the turn, we read:
But that prophet or that dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he has taught rebellion against the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt and redeemed you out of the house of slavery, to make you leave the way in which the Lord your God commanded you to walk. So you shall purge the evil from your midst" (Deuteronomy 13: 5-6).
So the prophet or the dreamer o f dreams "shall be put to death". If this is interpreted as a description o f what will happen after death, this text may still be compatible with contemporary civil and penal law for these are only applicable to the situation here on earth. It is not very polite perhaps to tell other people that they will burn in hell for what they believe or not believe, but as long as the furnace is not ignited in this life these visions about what happens in the hereafter do not have to give us great worry. It appears from the context, however, that the Bible is not simply making a factual statement about what will happen to our souls in a future life, but admonishes the believers in this world to execute the false prophet or the "dreamer o f dreams" among the living. That means: the individual believer is exhorted -in contemporary jargon -to "take the law into his own hands" and purge the community o f false prophets.
That the Bible takes this point seriously is clear from further commen tary on the way this prescript should be interpreted. There it appears that this injunction is not restricted to unknown people but should also be ap plied to those most intimate and dear to us. Our brother, our son, daughter, wife or friend -they should all be put to death if they preach rebellion against the Lord. In Deuteronomy 13:6-12 we read: if your brother, the son of your mother, or your son or your daughter or the wife you embrace or your friend who is as your own soul entices you secretly, saying, "let us go and serve other gods", which neither you nor your fathers have known, some of the gods of the peoples who are around you, whether near you or far off from you, from one end of the earth to the other, you shall not yield to him or listen to him, nor shall your eye pity him, nor shall you spare him, nor shall you conceal him. But you shall kill him. Your hand shall be first against him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people.
You shall stone him to death with stones, because he sought to draw you away from the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery. And all Israel shall hear and fear and never again do any such wickedness as this among you.
"Warning against idolatry" is an unduly euphemistic qualification o f what we find here, so it appears. It is a warning to idolaters, false prophets, and dreamers o f dreams, but the text also spells out in no uncertain terms what has to be done with them. They deserve the death penalty. And the execution o f this death penalty is not reserved for God in the hereafter, but the text proclaims it to be the specific duty o f all members o f the Jewish tribe to execute this death penalty.
Furthermore, we should not be distracted from our religious duties when the false prophet is our son, our daughter, brother or wife. Especially when it comes to those dear to us: we should be the first to throw the stone, the rest o f the community has to follow.
In modern terminology we should qualify this as a prohibition o f apos tasy (Zwemer, 1924; Ibn Warraq, 2003; Jami 2007; Ahadi, 2008) . W hen we compare this provision in the Bible with modern constitutions and modern text-books o f penal law there is a manifest contradiction. Modern con stitutions and treaties on human rights proclaim the freedom o f religion. That freedom also comprises the freedom to reject one specific religion or relinquish all religions. This is stated clearly in art. 18 o f the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights (1948):
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance" (italics added; PC).
So here we have a manifest contradiction between modern constitu tional texts such as The Universal Declaration o f Human Rights and "Holy Scripture" as handed down by the ancient religions o f the book.
That contradiction is not restricted to the matter o f apostasy. The text in Deuteronomy also has a completely different opinion about taking the law into your own hands than the modern state does. Deuteronomy presents no guiding rules for how an earth-bound government has to deal with the m at ter o f apostasy; it does not even refer to God. It is the individual member o f the community who is assigned to be law officer and executioner. We all have to stone the apostates and those inciting others to embrace the false gods ourselves.
Obviously, this would be detrimental to civil order and to the principle o f free speech. And this would not only be detrimental to the modern civil order, by the way, but it would also have undermined ancient states and communities. No state, whether ancient or modern, can condone violence perpetrated by citizens themselves (Weber, 1966, p. 27 It is not so clear whether M oses' last command is identical to what the Lord commanded. The Lord seemed to exact the killing and punishment o f all the chiefs. Moses, though, seems to build in a proviso: he ordered the killing o f only those who had actually yielded to the temptation o f the daughters o f Moab. So for Moses a precondition for punishment was per sonal guilt (mens rea). From a modern perspective this seems almost self evident, but not everybody in the community was satisfied with the way Moses handled the matter. There was a certain Phinehas who defied Moses' authority and took the law into its own hands. The immediate occasion for this was the following.
Phinehas saw how one o f the men o f Israel brought a Midianite woman to his tent. (Numbers 25: 6). W hen Phinehas saw this, he rose and left the congregation and took a spear. He "went after the man o f Israel into the chamber and pierced both o f them, the man o f Israel and the woman through her belly" (Numbers 25: 8).
So far, we only have an exciting, although gruesome, story. W hat makes the story interesting, however, is the Lord's reaction. W hat did God say about phinehas slaying the people who, according to modern standards, were perfectly justified in praying to gods o f their own choosing ( since they are protected by the freedom o f religion, after all)? The Lord sided with Phinehas and M oses' authority was clearly defied on the basis o f the subsequent events. The Lord said to Moses: "Phinehas the son o f Eleazar, son o f Aaron the priest, has turned back my wrath from the people o f Israel" (Numbers 25: 10). Phinehas was even rewarded for the man and wom an's public execution without trial. The Lord said:
Behold, I give to him my covenant of peace, and it shall be to him and to his descendants after him the covenant of a perpetual priesthood, because he was jealous for his God and made atonement for the people of Israel (Numbers 25: 13).
So those who flout the legitimate authority o f the temporal leaders o f the people (Moses) are rewarded by God. Apparently, Phinehas' religious zeal is appreciated more by God than M oses' cautious way o f dealing with the matter. This stance can have (and is likely to have) grave consequences. This can be seen as substantial encouragement to those who claim spe cial knowledge o f God's will and are prepared to perpetrate violence in defiance o f the traditional political leaders o f the state. Phinehas can be seen as the archetypical religious terrorist. Phinehas is prepared, on reli gious grounds ("I know what God wants") to use violence against citizens o f the state, thereby violating the law o f the state and defying legitimate authority. That is the essence o f the religious terrorist. As Amos Guiora rightly states: "terrorism is the conflict between nation-states and non-state entities" (2008, p. 4) . Phinehas was such a non-state entity. Yigal Amir was another. W hen Yigal Amir killed Yitzak Rabin in 1995 on the basis o f religious considerations, or when contemporary Islamist terrorists kill or intimidate people because their victims are accused o f "blasphemy" (cf. the Danish cartoonists or the Dutch writer Theo van Gogh) this all adheres to the same pattern. The religious terrorist wants to "punish" or intimidate the blasphemer and instil fear into the hearts o f the citizenry.
W hat makes the story both interesting and disconcerting at the same time, is the fact that Phinehas' ruthless behaviour is more appreciated by the Lord than the way Moses had handled the matter. After all, Phinehas brought the people o f Israel back on the right track, the Bible tells us. The people o f Israel are expected to serve one God and one God only; the Lord. In the Ten Commandments this is put thus; "You shall have no other gods before m e" (Exodus 20:3).
It is clear that this attitude and the whole worldview connected with it is hard to reconcile with modern freedom o f religion, freedom o f wor ship, freedom o f speech, freedom o f conscience, free inquiry and other fundamental rights ingrained in the concept o f liberal democracy. It is, o f course, possible to acknowledge the prohibition o f venerating strange gods as a private religious command, but the state cannot act upon this political morality without violating modern human rights. The problem with Holy Scripture (used as a comprehensive term for the Koran and the Bible as well) is that -at least when taken in a literal wayit fails to educate citizens. It defines people as members o f a religious com munity. It tells them that their highest moral commitments are those for mulated by their own god. As long as the moral injunctions o f the religious community are the same as the laws and morals o f the national community the inherently problematic nature o f this point o f view is obscured, but once they diverge a problem arises. W hat should the sincere believer do? W hat precepts should he follow? Here we have the essence of the religious believer's problem. And this problem is clearly described and also pro vided with a solution (although it may not be "our" solution) in the biblical and Koranic stories. The primary moral responsibility o f man is towards his religious community or -what amounts to the same -to his God.
Although contemporary states in the western world are not directly based on religious Scripture they have been developed against the background o f theistic culture. And that makes them vulnerable to the type o f logic that inheres in the great theistic creeds. Not only is Sura 24:2 influential in contemporary Saudi Arabia but Deuteronomy 13 also has some bearing on the actual course o f events in this world. Compared to the passage from the Koran, the passage from Deuteronomy probably has less influence in, e.g., a Western country than Sura 24:2 has in Saudi Arabia. There are no Chris tian states (the United States o f America, for instance) or Jewish states (Israel, for instance) where the freedom o f religion is curtailed on the basis o f Deuteronomy 13. But let us phrase the question slightly differently; is it likely that Deuteronomy 13 still manifests a certain influence on our penal law, for instance in clauses about blasphemy? If phrased in this way, the answer is probably affirmative. The Dutch penal code still has a provision for blasphemy in article 147 (which the government has indicated it wishes to abolish within the foreseeable future while at the same time extending the ambit o f another article that penalizes incitement to religious hatred).
This article is almost a dead letter because the Central Prosecutors Of fice is not very active in bringing cases o f blasphemy before the court. But the possibility still exists and this has something to do with the religious past o f Europe. So Deuteronomy 13 (and other passages) certainly had influence on the suppression o f freedom o f speech and freedom o f religion in the world o f Christianity, although that influence was much more perva sive in the 16th and 17th centuries than it is now. From 1559 until 1966 the Catholic Church upheld the Index librorum prohibitorum. Until 1820 the Inquisition was active and deterred many dissidents from heterodoxy and heresy. Should we say that those practices were not in any way related to Christian Holy Scripture? Is there no relationship between passages such as Deuteronomy 13 and the Inquisition? That is hardly credible. Jesus says: "And if your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and throw it away. For it is better that you lose one o f your members than that your whole body go into hell" (Matth. 5:30). Once we identify society with the "body" and the individual with the "hand" the suggestion arises that the heretic should be eliminated from society in order to forestall the perdition o f the whole community, precisely as was advocated in Deuteronomy 13.
O f course, other interpretations are possible. But that is not the point. The point is that an interpretation such as I have presented here is not ludi crous, and this is the way this passage has been interpreted in the past. We may like to forget this, but that is not a sensible course to follow. In a time when radicalism is on the rise we have to be prepared that some religious believers may present such radical interpretations.
There is probably the same relationship at work here as between the flogging o f women in Saudi Arabia and Sura 24:2. Again, religion does not exist "per se", as a metaphysical entity in a transcendent realm o f ideas, but is a social force that acts on the morals, politics and judicial system o f its believers.
Many apologists for religion, especially o f the liberal brand, vehement ly deny this. Any supposed relationship between the actual suppression o f freedom o f conscience and freedom o f religion and the scriptural passages manifesting the same attitude (Deuteronomy 13) is denied. Those practices are "cultural", but have nothing to do with religion as such. But we may wonder whether the apologists for religion are not simply fooling us and themselves as well. If believers declare their Scripture to be "holy" it is very likely that they really mean what they say: "holy". And one o f the consequences o f this is that they consider the content o f their Holy Scrip ture as relevant for their ethical convictions.
Although that insight is not very popular, this should not scare us off. The only thing that should guide us is the truth.
That ideal should be pursued not only because o f the loftiness of the ideal in itself but because an effective reformation o f religious thought can only be accomplished on the basis of a realistic estimate o f what the problems are. It is only those books that can give us an idea o f the connection between religion and violence. The major problem, however, is not that these books are contested, but that they are ignored by many people. The vast majority o f people reading about religion prefer to read literature that places reli gion in the most favourable light, such as the books by Karen Armstrong (2007) .
Assessing the violent aspects o f religion does not rule out, o f course, that religion has stimulated many positive developments in world history. The American Declaration o f Independence starts with the ringing words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights" (italics are mine; PC). Here we find the basis for the American system o f law: all men are created equal. The drafters o f the Declaration state that because o f this status as a creature o f God, the human being is in possession o f inalien able rights. This is a great idea! Every single human being is the bearer o f certain fundamental rights that cannot be denied by the government. This idea changed the whole course o f history and, we can safely say, this was a change for the better. Pragmatists might say; "You see? The idea o f God as a creator is very useful. It brought us the idea o f inalienable rights." This pragmatist is right, to a certain extent. But we can, o f course, also consider the question whether it would be possible to defend the idea o f inalienable rights without the idea of a Creator. Is that possible too? If the people in 1776 accepted inalienable rights as a gift o f God, does that imply that we, living in the 21st century, still have to believe in the same connection to sustain the notion o f human rights for the future? Or can we adopt inalien able rights and proclaim our own non-theistic foundation?
This is important, because, as we have seen in this chapter, religion has an evil side that ought to be criticized. The attempt to argue that the evil sides o f religion are simply "not religious", as Herbert Spencer and many others have done, is simply not convincing. Religion has to be subjected to criticism because only when this is accomplished can religion be purified o f its nastier aspects.
Religious criticism should be fair, but straightforward. Limiting reli gious criticism within the confines that liberal interpretation wants to ac knowledge is not enough. If we maintain the myth o f authoritative scrip ture, as even the "moderate" or "liberal" believers do, we will make little progress. One o f the things that make theism problematic is that theism is easily interpreted as the doctrine that a personal god exists who has revealed his will in Holy Scripture, which must be followed no matter what the conse quences will be. I have illustrated this by referring to some examples de rived from two important holy scriptures: the Koran and the Bible. The first example was Koran 24:2 stating that an adulterer and an adulteress shall each be punished by whipping. A second example was a text from Deuter onomy 13: 5-6, indicating that a prophet seducing the people o f Israel to adore strange gods should be put to death. The example from the Bible was backed up by another passage from the Bible, but this time a "story"; the story o f Phinehas, as told in Chapter 25 o f the book o f Numbers. Phinehas is an interesting figure, because he murdered two people (one o f his fellow Israeli men and one woman from a different tribe) who he deemed guilty o f adoring false gods (i.e. not the god o f Israel). And the legitimate authority, Moses, did not act in accordance with what Phinehas thought should be the appropriate reaction; a swiff and extra-legal execution. So Phinehas took the law into his own hands and executed what he thought was the only ap propriate punishment; killing the people who had violated the law o f God. We have also seen that the Lord, according to the story, did not disapprove o f what Phinehas had done but that he was even rewarded.
With the story o f Phinehas I have tried not only to demonstrate that Holy Scripture sometimes advocates atrocious acts (which could be illus trated by other examples as well), but to give an idea o f what could be called a "religious terrorist". A religious terrorist is someone who defies the legitimate authorities o f the state, does not acknowledge the law o f the state, and, based on Scripture, draws his own conclusions, even if these are radical indeed.
The common reaction to the line o f argument set out in this article is that o f the group o f people who think religion has no real influence on what happens in the world. Those people will say that it is no problem that some times old books tell strange stories or advocate misdeeds because no sen sible person would take these stories seriously. This group is composed of believers and unbelievers alike. W hy unbelievers tend to think along these lines is clear; unbelievers tend to underestimate the importance o f Holy Scripture. They are unbelievers, after all. They find it difficult to under stand that people are seriously convinced that mingling should be punished by lashes simply because this is prescribed in an old book. And that people should be killed because they have changed from one religion to another ("Take all the chiefs o f the people and hang them in the sun before the Lord", as prescribed in Numbers 25) will be considered by many people as utterly repulsive. Also, taking the law into your own hands and execut ing these cruel prescripts, as Phinehas did, is beyond the wildest dreams o f most moral agents. But here comes my point; this is in fact so fa r beyond the wildest dreams o f ordinary people that they tend to think that nobody can take Scripture seriously i f it prescribes immoral deeds. And so they are not worried at all by draconian measures as prescribed in Scripture. They belittle the significance of this by telling us that it is only a "matter o f interpretation". Or, they will tell us that the overwhelming majority o f believers are not inclined to perpetrate immoral acts on the basis o f Scrip ture. The conclusion they draw from this fact is that because numerically the extremists are such a small group we should not worry too much about those stories, which are considered to be "just stories" or "just texts" .
W hat can we say o f this? In fact, this argument has already been an swered. I have shown that Sura 24:2 certainly has a modicum o f influence in some places in the world (to phrase it very cautiously). There are places in the world, for instance, where Sura 24:2 is even more important than the law o f the land. That is because the law o f the land should always be interpreted against the backdrop o f Sura 24:2 or, if it contradicts Sura 24:2, the law is considered illegitimate.
That brings me to a third objection. There will be people who argue as follows: "All right, you made your point with Sura 24:2, but with the bib lical passage from Deuteronomy and the story o f Phinehas you were less convincing." This group will point out that there is a "great difference" between the Koran and the Bible. They are both called "holy books" and at a superficial level there are some similarities, but the differences are greater than the similarities. And these differences are especially important for the matter o f religious violence.
There is a host o f differences that one can refer to, and my list o f these disparities will not be exhaustive, but sufficient to understand what the matter is all about.
It may be possible to say: "The Bible is not one book, but two. And the second book, the New Testament, has mitigated the stern passages from the first book, the Old Testament." It is clear that Christians especially (and not orthodox Jews) will be likely to refer to the "two-books-argument" . So as a reaction to the story about Phinehas in the Old Testament it may be pos sible to point to Romans 13 from the New Testament. There we read: "Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no au thority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgm ent" (Romans 13: 1-3). This seems a good answer to the "anarchistic" story o f Phinehas who rebelled against the legitimate authority o f Moses. If Phinehas would have read Romans 13 he could have known that he should not have resisted the authority o f Moses who was governing him.
It would also be possible perhaps to point to the well-known passage on Caesar and Christ. Matthew 22:21 formulates it as follows: "Therefore render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." In taking this passage as our point o f departure and not Romans 13, it might be possible to argue, perhaps, that Phinehas was a kind o f "spirit ual authority" and that Moses was the worldly leader. Phinehas should not have claimed such a worldly affair as the administration o f earthly justice. That is the province o f Moses. Phinehas should only have proclaimed that the Israelites who prayed to the wrong gods forfeited their place in heaven or became fit for some punishment in the world hereafter. But by claiming worldly power he violated the principle o f the separation o f church and state that Jesus Christ so notoriously inaugurated.
A second difference between the Bible and the Koran that is often re ferred to is that the Bible does not speak directly to people in this time. Its message is, so to speak, much more indirect. To substantiate that contention one can, again, refer to the story o f Phinehas. This is a story. And stories have to be interpreted. The Bible does not tell contemporary Christians or contemporary Jews that they should now kill all the apostates or those who want to change from one religion to another. The story from Deuteronomy tells us something about Jewish history. And perhaps not even that.
The same could be said about the story o f Abraham. This is nothing more than a story. God did not address every reader but only Abraham, just this specific person in a very specific situation. It is impossible to draw general conclusions from this.
Is this a convincing argument? I do not think so. The story o f Abraham has an unmistakably moral purpose and -I am afraid -the story o f Phine has does as well. But even if we insist on denying this, there is still the question o f whether that denial is relevant. Because whatever the case may be: extremists will read the stories as having moral significance.
A third difference between the Bible and the Koran that some people present is that we have to take the attitude o f the believers into account as well. There may have been one Yigal Amir killing one Yitzak Rabin whilst referring to a divine mission. But if that is the Jewish counterpart o f the Islamist suicide bomber, the example o f Amir dwindles into insignificance compared with the examples from the Islamist tradition.
A fourth response coming from this third group will be that they will point out that the Bible is mitigated by many other books and commentar ies. If we want to understand the Torah, we have to read the Talmud as well. And the Talmud will teach us how to interpret the Torah. o n c e we engage in this type o f study it will be clear why Jewish terrorism pales in comparison with Islamist terrorism.
W hat could be our reaction? Isn't this type o f criticism fairly convinc ing?
I beg to disagree. Actually, those thinking along these lines have missed the gist o f the argumentation that has been developed here. I am not en gaged in a kind o f empirical study about the dangers o f respectively Islam ist, Jewish and Christian terrorism. W hat I try to understand is religious terrorism as an important manifestation o f religious evil. That the actual danger this religious terrorism poses in some varieties o f theism is much greater than in others is true, but at the same time it is irrelevant. I side with Bernard Lewis and other commentators in contending that the similarities between the three theistic faiths on a doctrinal level are important for our analysis, even if the actual manifestations in terms of vulnerability to ter rorist influences differ significantly (Lewis, 2003, p. 4) .
W hat about the "two books-argument"? Isn't it clear that there is a dif ference in character between the Bible and the Koran? There may be an element o f truth in that, but the question is whether it is relevant. At least, we should not overestimate the importance o f this difference. The Koran is composed o f many suras. Those suras are commonly divided into the suras from the period o f Mecca and the suras from the period o f Medina. Those critical o f Islam usually say that the Medina suras (usually more inclined to condone the harsh practices that pose a problem to modern liberal de mocracies) have abrogated the harsher Meccan suras. But the apologists answer that we should go back to the more "original" Meccan period to find "pure Islam".
The second point mentioned before, viz. that the story o f Phinehas is a "story" is true, but it is a story with an unmistakably clear message. So I do not agree with Robert Spencer who writes that the traditional under standing o f the Koran is "far beyond the biblical idea that God inspired human authors. Allah dictated every word o f the Q ur'an to the Prophet Mohammed through the Angel Gabriel. Allah him self is the only speaker throughout the Q ur'an, and most often he addresses Muhammad, frequent ly telling him what to say to various adversaries" (Spencer, 2003, p. 127) . In my view Spencer underestimates the similarities between the three theistic faiths. The problem is that if Holy Scriptures are, indeed, considered "holy" and they contain only a small percentage o f passages that incite violence, those scriptures can still cause much harm. I already quoted Bernard Lewis who said: "terrorism requires only a few" (Lewis, 2003, p. xxviii) . He re ferred to the fact that we only need a few firm believers who are prepared to do the dirty work. But we can also say: "terrorism requires only a few passages in the holy book". If the holy book contains only a small percent age o f passages invoking violence they pose a problem if the whole book is considered to be holy and the word o f God. 
